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Abstract—The insider threat remains one of the most vexing
problems in computer security. A number of approaches have
been proposed to detect nefarious insider actions including user
modeling and profiling techniques, policy and access enforcement
techniques, and misuse detection. In this work we propose
trap-based defense mechanisms and a deployment platform for
addressing the problem of insiders attempting to exfiltrate and
use sensitive information. The goal is to confuse and confound
an adversary requiring more effort to identify real information
from bogus information and provide a means of detecting when
an attempt to exploit sensitive information has occurred. “Decoy
Documents” are automatically generated and stored on a file
system by the D3 System with the aim of enticing a malicious user.
We introduce and formalize a number of properties of decoys as
a guide to design trap-based defenses to increase the likelihood of
detecting an insider attack. The decoy documents contain several
different types of bogus credentials that when used, trigger an
alert. We also embed “stealthy beacons” inside the documents
that cause a signal to be emitted to a server indicating when
and where the particular decoy was opened. We evaluate decoy
documents on honeypots penetrated by attackers demonstrating
the feasibility of the method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much research in computer security has focused on the
means of preventing unauthorized and illegitimate access to
systems and information. Unfortunately, the most damaging
malicious activity is the result of internal misuse within an
organization, perhaps since far less attention has been focused
inward. Despite classic internal operating system security
mechanisms and the body of work on formal specification of
security and access control policies, including Bell-LaPadula
[1] and the Clark-Wilson models [4], we still have an extensive
insider attack problem. Indeed in many cases, formal security
policies are incomplete and implicit or they are purposely
ignored in order to get business goals accomplished. There
seems to be little technology available to address the insider
threat problem.
Insider attack has overtaken viruses and worm attacks as
the most reported security incident according to a report from
the US Computer Security Institute (CSI) [20]. The annual
Computer Crime and Security Survey for 2007 surveyed
494 security personnel members from US corporations and
government agencies, finding that insider incidents were cited
by 59 percent of respondents, while only 52 percent said they
had encountered a conventional virus in the previous year. The
state-of-the-art seems to be still driven by forensics analysis
after an attack, rather than technologies that prevent, detect,
and deter insider attack.
We define insider threats by differentiating between Mas-
queraders (attackers who impersonate another inside user) and
Traitors (an inside attacker using their own legitimate creden-
tials). One possible solution for masquerade detection involves
anomaly detection [28]. In this approach, users actions are
profiled to form a baseline of normal behavior. Subsequent
monitoring for abnormal behaviors that exhibit large deviations
from this baseline [17] signal a potential insider attack. The
common strategy to prevent inside attacks involves policy-
based access control techniques to limit the scope of systems
and information an insider is authorized to use, and hence,
limit the damage the organization may incur when an insider
goes awry. Prevention techniques may not always succeed, and
thus, monitoring and detection techniques are needed when
prevention fails. In this paper, we are focused on different
techniques aimed at detecting masqueraders and traitors.
We note that some external attackers can become insiders
when an outsider attains internal network access. Many attacks
use spyware and rootkits [3], which give outsiders internal
access. Such software can easily be installed on systems from
physical or digital media (e.g., email, downloads) and allow
an attacker administrator or “root” access on a machine along
with a means to gather sensitive data. Rootkits have the ability
to conceal themselves and elude detection, especially when
the rootkit is previously unknown, as is true in zero-day
attacks [8]. An external attacker that manages to install rootkits
internally in effect becomes an insider, thereby multiplying the
ability to inflict harm. Although the techniques described in
this paper may have utility for these cases, in this paper our
primary focus is on human insiders attempting to exfiltrate
sensitive information. By exfiltration we mean unauthorized
copying and transmission of information by any means.
The insider attack defense system described in this paper
is of an offensive nature, intended to confuse and deceive a
traitor by leveraging uncertainty, to reduce the knowledge they
ordinarily have of the systems and data they might be autho-
rized to use. This work considers methods to detect insider
actions against enterprise systems as well as individual hosts
and laptops. We introduce a deception system to distribute
potentially large amounts of decoy information with the aim to
detect nefarious acts as well as to increase the workload of an
attacker to identify real information from bogus information,
rather than providing unfettered access as broadly exists today.
We developed a system to generate and place decoy documents
within a file system. Our system generates decoy documents
containing decoy credentials that are monitored (e.g., Gmail
credential monitoring) for misuse and stealthily embedded
beacons that signal an alert when the document is opened.
To achieve the goal of wide spread deception we must
consider methods to trap a wide variety of potential insiders
with varying levels of sophistication. Toward this goal, we
developed a proof-of-concept system we call D3, the Decoy
Document Distributor system. Samples of D3 generated doc-
uments are presented in the Appendix. The contributions of
this paper include:
• A novel set of generally applicable properties are pro-
posed to guide the design and deployment of decoys and
maximize the deception they induce for different classes
of insiders who vary by their level of knowledge and
sophistication.
• A large-scale automated creation and management system
for deploying decoys that can detect the presence (and,
in some cases, “identity”) of malicious insiders, or at
least indicate malicious insider activity. This provides
a means for ordinary users to deploy honey documents
without having to setup sophisticated honeypot systems
and sensors.
• An offensive trap-based defense system is proposed to
detect masqueraders and traitors, and to flood attackers
with bogus exfiltrated information that they must analyze
in order to find real information of value. Hence, our
long term goal is to flood the miscreant marketplace with
bogus information devaluing their quarry.
• A design of decoy information that combines a number of
methods and monitors, both internal and external, to de-
tect insider exploitation using a common and ubiquitous
set of baited targets, ordinary looking documents.
1) A watermark is embedded in the binary format of
the document file to detect when the decoy is loaded
in memory, or egressed in the open over a network.
2) A “beacon” is embedded in the decoy document
that signals a remote web site upon opening of the
document indicating the malfeasance of an insider
illicitly reading bait information.
3) If these methods fail to detect an insider attack or
an exfiltration of baited documents, the content of
the documents contain bait and decoy information
that is monitored as well. Bogus logins at multiple
organizations as well as bogus and realistic bank
information is monitored by external means.
• An easy to use system to broadly deploy decoys to
ordinary users who are alerted by email when a decoy has
been touched on their laptops and personal computers; no
such system presently exists.
In the camera ready version of this paper, we will provide
the reader with a link to the Decoy Document Distribution
(D3) web site to evaluate the technology developed to date. It
has been removed to fully anonymize the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The use of deception, or decoys, plays a valuable role in the
protection of systems, networks, and information. The first use
of decoys (i.e., in the cyber domain) has been credited to Cliff
Stoll [30], [24] and detailed in his novel “The Cuckoos Egg”
[25], where he provides a thorough account of his crusade
to catch German hackers breaking into Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory computer systems. Stoll’s methods included the
use of bogus networks, systems, and documents to gather
intelligence on the German attackers who were apparently
seeking state secrets. Among the many techniques waged, he
crafted “bait” files, or in his case, bogus classified documents
that really contained non-sensitive government information
and attached “alarms” to them so that he would know if anyone
accessed at them. To Stoll’s credit, a German hacker was
eventually caught and it was found that he had been selling
secrets to the KGB.
Deception-based information resources that have no pro-
duction value other than to attract and detect adversaries (like
those used by Stoll) are commonly known as Honeypots [11].
Honeypots serve as effective tools for profiling attacker behav-
ior and to gather intelligence to understand how attackers oper-
ate. Honeypots are considered to have low false positive rates
since they are designed to capture only malicious attackers,
except for perhaps an occasional mistake by innocent users.
Spitzner described how honeypots can be useful for detecting
insider attack [23], in addition to the common external threats
for which they are traditionally known. He discusses the use
of honeytokens, which he defines as “a honeypot that is not
a computer” [24], citing examples that include bogus medical
records, credit card numbers, and credentials, with descriptions
of how they can be used to detect malicious insiders [23], [24].
In a similar spirit, Webb et al. [27] showed how honeypots can
be useful for detecting spammers. Although spam is not the
focus of this work, their deceptive approach to detecting it
may be applicable. In current systems, the decoy/honeytoken
creation is a laborious and manual process requiring large
amounts of administrator intervention. In contrast, we propose
the seeding of decoy information (of various different types)
throughout an operational system. Our work extends these
basic ideas to an automated system of managing the creation
and deployment of these honeytokens.
Yuill et al. [30] extend the notion of honeytokens with a
“honeyfile system” to support the creation of bait files, or
as they define them, “honeyfiles.” The honeyfile system is
implemented as an enhancement to the Network File Server.
The system allows for any file within user file space to become
a honeyfile through the creation of a record associating a
filename to userid. The honeyfile system monitors all file
access on the server and alerts users when honeyfiles have
been accessed. Their work does not focus on the content or
automatic creation of files, but they do elicit some of the
challenges of creating deceptive files (with respect to names)
that we address in section 4.
In this paper, we introduce a set of properties of decoys
to guide their design and maximize the deception they induce
for different classes of insiders who vary by their level of
knowledge and sophistication. To the best of our knowledge,
the synthesis of these properties is indeed novel a contribution.
Bell and Whaley [2] have described the structure of deception
as a process of hiding the real and showing showing the
false. They introduce several methods of hiding that include
masking, repackaging, and dazzling, along with three methods
of showing that include mimicking, inventing, and decoying.
Yuill et al. [29] expand upon this work and characterize
deceptive hiding in terms of how it defeats an adversary’s
discovery process. They describe an adversary’s discovery
process as taking three forms: direct observation, investigation
based on evidence, and learning from other people or agents.
Their work offers a process model for creating deceptive
hiding techniques based on how they defeat an adversary’s
discovery process.
The decoy documents introduced in this paper utilize similar
deception mechanisms as well as beacons to signal a remote
detect and alert in real-time time when a decoy has been
opened. Web bugs are a class of silent embedded tokens which
have been used to track usage habits of web or email users
[18]. Unfortunately, they have been most closely associated
with unscrupulous operators, such as spammers, virus writers,
and spyware authors who have used them to violate users
privacy. Typically they will be embedded in the HTML portion
of an email message as a non-visible white on white image,
but they have also been demonstrated in other forms such
as Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint documents [21].
When rendered as HTML, a web bug triggers a server update
which allows the sender to note when and where the web bug
was viewed. Animated images allow the senders to monitor
how long the message was displayed. The web bugs operate
without alerting the user of the tracking mechanisms. The
advantage for legitimate advertisers is that this allows them to
monitor advertisement effectiveness, while privacy advocates
worry that this technology can be misused to spy on users’
habits. Our work leverages the same ideas, but extends them
to other document classes and is more sophisticated in the
methods used to draw attention. In addition, our targets are
insiders who should have no expectation of privacy on a
system they violate.
III. THREAT MODEL - LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION OF THE
ATTACKER
The insider seeks to identify and avoid the decoys and
abscond with “real” information. We broadly define four
monotonically increasing levels of insider sophistication and
capability. Some will have tools available to assist in deciding
what is a decoy and what is real. Others will only have their
own observations and thoughts.
• Low: Direct observation is the only tool available. The
adversary largely depends on what can be gleaned from
a first glance. We strive to defeat this level of adversary
with our beacon documents, even though decoys with
embedded beacons may be distinguished with more ad-
vanced tools.
• Medium: A more thorough investigation can be per-
formed by the insider; decisions based on other, possibly
outside evidence, can be made. For example, if a decoy
document contains a decoy account credential for a par-
ticular identity, an adversary may verify that the particular
identity is real or not by querying an external system
(such as www.whitepages.com). Such adversaries will
require stronger decoy information possibly corroborated
by other sources of evidence.
• High: Access to the most sophisticated tools are available
to the attacker (e.g., super computers, other informed
people who have organizational information). The notion
of the “Perfect Decoy” described in the next section may
be the only indiscernible decoy by an adversary of such
caliber.
• Highly Privileged: Probably the most dangerous of all
is the privileged and highly sophisticated user. Such
attackers might even be aware that the system is baited
and will employ sophisticated tools to try to analyze,
disable, and avoid decoys entirely. As an example of how
defeating this level of threat might be possible, consider
the analogy with someone who knows encryption is used
(and which encryption algorithm is used), but still cannot
break the system because they do not have knowledge
of an easy-to-change operational parameter (the key).
Likewise, just because someone knows that decoys are
used in the system does not mean they should be able to
identify them. This is the principal– coming up with a
scheme to satisfy it remains an open problem.
IV. GENERATING AND DISTRIBUTING BAIT
In order to create decoys to bait various levels of insiders,
one must understand the core properties of a decoy that will
successfully bait an insider.
A. Decoy Properties
We enumerate various properties and means of measuring
these properties that are associated with decoy documents to
ensure their use will be likely to snare an inside attacker. We
introduce the following notation for these definitions.
Believable1: Capable of eliciting belief or trust; capable
of being believed; appearing true; seeming to be true or
authentic.
A good decoy should make it difficult for an adversary to
discern whether they are looking at an authentic document
from a legitimate source or if they are indeed looking at a
decoy. We conjecture that believability of any particular decoy
can be measured by adversary’s failure to discern one from
the other. We formalize this by defining a decoy believability
experiment. The experiment is defined for the document space
M with the set of decoys D such that D ⊆ M and M −D
is the set of authentic documents.
The Decoy Believability Experiment: ExpbelieveA,D,M
• For any d ∈ D, choose two documents m0,m1 ∈ M
such that m0 = d or m1 = d, and m0 6= m1; that is, one
1For clarity, each property is provided with its definition gleaned from
online dictionary sources.
is a decoy we wish to measure the believability of and
the second is chosen at random from the set of authentic
documents.
• Adversary A obtains m0,m1 and attempts to choose
mˆ ∈ {m0,m1} such that mˆ 6= d, using only information
intrinsic to m0,m1.
• The output of the experiment is 1 if mˆ 6= d and 0
otherwise.
For concreteness, we build upon the definition of “Perfect
Secrecy” proposed in the cryptography community [13] and
define a “perfect decoy” when:
Pr[ExpbelieveA,D,M = 1] = 1/2
The decoy is chosen in a believability experiment with a
probability of 1/2 (the outcome that would be achieved if the
volunteer decided completely at random). That is, a perfect
decoy is one that is completely indistinguishable from one
that is not. A benefit of this definition is that the challenge
of showing a decoy to be believable, or not, reduces to the
problem of creating a “distinguisher” that can decide with
probability better than 1/2.
In practice, the construction of a “perfect decoy” might
be unachievable, especially through automatic means, but the
notion remains important as it provides a goal to strive for in
our design and implementation of systems. For many threat
models, it might suffice to have less than perfect believable
decoys. For our proof-of-concept system described below,
we generate receipts and tax documents, and other common
form-based documents with decoy credentials, realistic names,
addresses and logins, all information that is familiar to all
users.
We note that the believable property of a decoy may be
less important than other properties defined below since the
attacker may have to open the decoy in order to decide whether
the document is real or not. The act of opening the document
may be all that we need to trap the insider, irrespective of
the believability of its content. Hence, enticing an attacker to
open a document, say one with a very interesting name, may
be a more effective strategy to detect an inside attack than
producing a decoy document with believable content.
Enticing: highly attractive and able to arouse hope or
desire; “an alluring prospect”; lure.
Herein lies the issue of how does one measure the extent
to which a decoy arouses desires, how well is it a lure? One
obvious way is to create decoys containing information with
monetary value, such as passwords or credit card numbers
that have black market value [15], [26]. However, enticement
depends upon the attacker’s intent or preference. We define
enticing documents in terms of the likelihood of an adversary’s
preference; enticing decoys are those decoys that are chosen
with the same likelihood. More formally, for the document
space M , let P be the set of documents of an adversary’s
A preference, where P ⊆ M . For some value  such that
 > 1/|M |, an enticing document is defined by the probability
Pr[m→M |m ∈ P ] > 
where m→M denotes m is chosen from M. An enticing
decoy is then defined for the set of decoys D, where
D ⊆M , such that
Pr[m→M |m ∈ P ] = Pr[d→M |d ∈ D]
We posit that by defining several general categories of
“things” that are of “attacker interest”, one may compose
decoys using terms or words that correspond to desires of
the attacker that are overwhelmingly enticing. For example,
if the attacker desires money, any document that mentions or
describes information that provides access to money should be
highly enticing. We believe we can measure frequently occur-
ring (search) terms associated with major categories of interest
(e.g., words or terms drawn from finance, medical information,
intellectual property) and use these as the constituent words in
decoy documents. To measure the effectiveness of this genera-
tive strategy, it should be possible to execute content searches
and count the number of times decoys appear in the top 10
list of displayed documents. This is a reasonable approach
also, to measuring how conspicuous, defined below, the decoys
become based upon the attacker’s searches associated with
their interest and intent.
Conspicuous: easily visible; easily or clearly visible;
obvious to the eye or mind; Attracting attention.
A conspicuous decoy should be easily found or observed.
Conspicuous is defined similar to enticing, but conspicu-
ous documents are found because they are easily observed,
whereas enticing documents are chosen because they are of
interest to an attacker. For the document space M , let V be
the set of documents defined by the minimum number of user
actions required to enable their view. We use a subscript to
denote the number of user actions required to view some set of
documents. For example, documents that are in view at logon
or on the desktop (requiring zero user actions) are labeled V0,
those requiring one user action are V1, etc. We define a “view”,
Vi of a set of documents as a function of a number of user
actions applied to a prior view, Vi−1, hence
Vi = Action(Vi−1) where Vj 6= Vi, j < i
An “Action” may be any command or function that displays
files and documents, such as ‘ls’, ‘dir’, ‘search.’ For some





where n is the minimum value where d ∈ Vn. Note if d is on
the desktop, V0, Pr[V0] = 1 (i.e., the documents in full view
are highly conspicuous).
Detectable; to discover or catch (a person) in the
performance of some act: to detect someone cheating.
Decoys must ensure an alert is generated if they are ex-
ploited. Formally, this is defined for adversary A, document
space M , and the set of decoys D such that D ⊆ M . We
use AlertA,d= 1 to denote an alert for d ∈ D. We say d is
detectable with probability  when
Pr[d→M : AlertA,d = 1] ≥ 
Ideally,  should be 1.
We designed the decoy documents with several techniques
to provide a good chance of detecting the malfeasance of an
inside attack in real-time.
• At time of application start-up, the decoy document emits
a beacon alert to a remote server.
• At the time of memory load, a host-sensor, such as an
antivirus scanner, may detect embedded tokens placed in
a clandestine location of the document file format.
• At the time of exfiltration, a NIDS such as Snort, or a
stream event detection system such as Cayuga [5] may be
used to detect these embedded tokens during the egress
of the decoy document in network traffic where possible.
• At time of information exploitation and/or credential
misuse, monitoring of decoy logins and other credentials
embedded in the document content by external systems
will generate an alert that is correlated with the decoy
document in which the credential was placed.
This extensive set of monitors maximizes , forcing the
attacker to expend considerable effort to avoid detection,
and hopefully will serve as a deterrent to reduce internal
malfeasance within organizations that deploy such a trap-based
defense. In the proof-of-concept implementation reported in
this paper, we focus our evaluation on the last item. We utilize
monitors at our local IT systems, at Gmail and at an external
bank.
Variability: The range of possible outcomes of a given
situation; the quality of being subject to variation.
Attackers are humans with insider knowledge, even possibly
with the knowledge that decoys are liberally spread throughout
an enterprise. Their task is to identify the real documents from
the potentially large cache of decoys. One important property
of the set of decoys is that they are not easily identifiable
due to some common invariant information they all share. A
single search or test function would thus easily distinguish
the real from the fake. The decoys thus must be highly varied.
We define variable in terms of the likelihood of being able to
decide the believability of a decoy given any known decoy.
Formally, we define perfectly variable for document space M
with the set of decoys D such that D ⊆M where
Pr[d′ → D : ExpbelieveA,D,M,d′ = 1] = 1/2
Observe that under this definition an adversary may have ac-
cess to all N previously generated decoys with the knowledge
they are bogus, but still lack the ability to discern the N+1st.
From a statistical perspective, each decoy is independent and
identically distributed. For the case that an adversary can
determine the N+1st decoy only after observing the N prior
decoys, we define this as an N-strong Variant.
Clearly, a good decoy generator should produce an un-
bounded collection of enticing, conspicuous, but distinct and
variable documents. They are distinct with respect to string
content. If the same sentence appears in 100 decoys, one would
not consider such decoys with repetitive information as highly
variable; the common invariant sentence(s) can be used as a
“signature” to find the decoys, rendering them distinguishable
(and clearly, less enticing).
Non-interference: Something that does not hinder,
obstructs, or impede.
Introducing decoys to an operational system has the poten-
tial to interfere with normal operations in multiple ways. Of
primary concern is that decoys may pollute authentic data so
that their legitimate usage becomes hindered by corruption or
as a result of confusion by legitimate users (i.e., they cannot
differentiate real from fake). We define non-interference in
terms of the likelihood of legitimate users successfully ac-
cessing normal documents after decoys are introduced. We
use AccessU,m = 1 to denote the success of a legitimate user
U accessing a normal document m. More formally, for some
value , the document space M , ∀m ∈M we define
Pr[AccessU,m = 1] ≥ 
on a system without decoys. Non-interference is then defined
for the set of decoys D such that D ⊆M and ∀m ∈M we
have
Pr[AccessU,m = 1] = Pr[AccessU,m = 1|D]
Although we seek to create decoys to ensnare an inside
attacker, a legitimate user whose data is the subject of an
attacker must still be able to identify their own real documents
from the planted decoys. The more enticing or believable a
decoy document may be, the more likely it would be to lead
the user to confuse it with a legitimate document they were
looking for. Our goal is to increase believability, conspicuous,
and enticingness while keeping interference low; ideally a
decoy should be completely non-interfering. The challenge is
to devise a simple and easy to use scheme for the user to
easily differentiate their own documents, and thus a measure
of interference is then possible as a by-product.
Differentiable: to mark or show a difference in;
constitute a difference that distinguishes; to develop
differential characteristics in; to cause differentiation of
in the course of development.
It is important that decoys be “obvious” to the legitimate
user to avoid interference, but “unobvious” to the insider
stealing information. We define this in terms of an inverted
believability experiment, in which the adversary is replaced
by a legitimate user. We say a decoy is differentiable if the
legitimate user always succeeds. Formally, we state this for
the document space M with the set of decoys D such that
D ⊆M where
Pr[ExpbelieveU,D,M = 1] = 1
How might we easily differentiate a decoy for the legitimate
user so that we maintain “non-interference” with the user’s
own actions and legitimate work? The remote thief who
exfiltrates all of a user’s files onto a remote hard drive may
be perplexed by having hundreds of decoys amidst a few real
documents; the thief should not be able to easily differentiate
between the two cases. If we store a hundred decoys for each
real document, the thief’s task is daunting; they would need to
test embedded information in the documents to decide what is
real and what is not, which should complicate their end goals.
For clarity, decoys should be easily differentiable to the legit-
imate user, but not to the attacker without significant effort.
Thus, the use of “beacons” or other embedded content in the
binary file format of a document, must be judiciously designed
and deployed to avoid making decoys trivially differentiable
for the attacker.
B. The Decoy Document Distributor (D3) System
The D3 web-based service generates and distributes decoy
documents to registered users. The decoy properties guide the
design of decoy templates in D3 that are used to generate
specific documents for download. The content of each decoy
document includes several types of “bait” information such
as online banking logins provided by a collaborating financial
institution2, login accounts for online servers, and web based
email accounts. In our deployment we used Anonymized
University student accounts and Gmail email accounts as
bait, but these can be customized to any set of monitored
credentials. These decoy credentials are “bait” and are enticing
targets for different types of adversaries [15], [14].
C. Decoy Document Design
The primary goal of the trap based defense is to detect
malfeasance. Since no system is foolproof, we propose that
multiple overlapping signals be embedded in the decoy doc-
uments to ensure detectability. Any alert generated by the
multiple decoys is an indicator that some insider activity
has occurred. Since the attacker may have varying levels
of sophistication, a combination of traps are used in decoy
documents to increase the likelihood one will succeed in
generating an alert. A sophisticated attacker may, for example,
disable the internal beacon, or cut off network connections
avoiding communication, disable or kill local host monitoring
processes, or they may exfiltrate documents via a web-browser
without opening them locally. The documents are designed
with several means of detecting their misuse:
• embedded honeytokens, computer login accounts created
that provide no access to valuable resources, and that are
monitored when (mis)used;
2By agreement, the institution request that its name be withheld.
• embedded honeytoken banking login accounts specifi-
cally created and monitored for this trap-based tech-
nology demonstration specifically to entice financially
motivated attackers;
• a network-level egress monitor that alerts whenever a
marker, specially planted in the decoy document, is
detected (we are collaborating with Cornell to use Cayuga
[5] for this purpose. Presently Snort may be used as
simple signature detector as a proof-of-concept);
• a host-based monitor that alerts whenever a decoy doc-
ument is “touched” in the file system such as a copy
operation;
• an embedded “beacon” alerts a remote server at a site at
Anonymized that we call SONAR. The web site emits an
email to the registered user who created and downloaded
the decoy document.
The implementation of features are described below.
1) Honeytokens: This layer of defense is made up of “bait”
information such as online banking logins provided by a
collaborating financial institution, credit card numbers, login
accounts for online servers, and web based email accounts
and is illustrated in Figure 1. The primary requirement for
bait is that it be detectable when (mis)used. For example, one
form of bait that we use are usernames and passwords for
Gmail accounts. D3 is integrated with a variety of services to
enable monitoring of these credentials once they are deployed
as decoys. In the case of the Gmail accounts, custom scripts
access mail.google.com to parse the bait account pages, gath-
ering account activity information. The information includes
the IP addresses for the previous 5 account accesses and the
time. If there is any activity from IP addresses other than D3’s
monitor, an alert is triggered with the time and IP of the of-
fending host. Alerts are also triggered when the monitor cannot
login to the bait account. In this case, we conclude that the
account password was stolen (unless monitoring resumes) and
the password changed unless other corroborating information
(like a network outage) can be used to convince otherwise.
In addition, some of our accounts have password monitors,
allowing us to produce a seemingly unbounded collection of
decoy variants for individual usernames.
In the case of financially motivated bait, we are beginning
to use real credit card numbers in addition to banking lo-
gin credentials. Many credit card providers offer “one-time-
credit-card numbers” and other forms of Controlled Payment
Numbers [19], which enable the generation of multiple credit
card numbers for a single account. In the case of PayPal,
single use credit card numbers can be generated with a
predetermined balance. The D3 monitor is being integrated
with the PayPal APIs to automatically monitor the activity
of the credit card numbers deployed through D3. As is the
case for all of the decoys, the benefit of deployment through
D3 is the automation, enabling their creation, monitoring, and
distribution en masse.
2) Beacon Implementation: The highly sophisticated at-
tacker will likely attempt to differentiate between a real
Fig. 1. Monitoring and deployment of bait decoys.
document and a decoy by analyzing the binary file format
prior to opening a file. This necessitates a design where
beacon code and watermarks in decoy documents are hidden
to avoid their easy identification. The attacker would surely
avoid the decoys if they could easily identify them by a simple
static test for an embedded beacon. The beacon code can be
embedded in documents in a number of ways and made to
appear statistically equivalent to its surrounding data using a
blending technique called “spectrum shaping” (see [22], [6]).
Such obfuscation techniques are very hard to defeat [16].
Using common techniques developed for malware, beacons
attempt to silently contact a centralized server with a unique
token embedded within the document at creation time. The
token is used to identify the decoy and document, the IP
address of the host accessing the decoy document. Depending
on the particular document type and the rendering environment
used during viewing of the beacon document, some additional
data may be collected.
The first proof-of-concept beacons have been implemented
in MSWord and PDF and deployed through the D3 web site. In
the case of the MS Word document beacons, the examples rely
on a stealthily embedded remote image that is rendered when
the document is opened. The request for the remote image is a
positive indication the document has been opened. In the case
of PDF document beacons, the signaling mechanism relies
on the execution of Javascript within the document. The D3
site includes a tutorial guiding the user on how to generate,
download, and enable the decoys’ silent communication on
hosts. It is important to point out that there are methods for
disabling the beacon mechanism. In Section V-B, we provide
an evaluation of beacon robustness.
3) Embedded Marker implementation: Beacon documents
contain embedded markers that a host or network sensor
may detect either when documents are loaded in memory
or transmitted in the clear. The markers are constructed as a
unique pattern of word tokens uniquely tied to the document
creator. The sequence of word tokens is embedded within the
beacon document’s meta-data area or reformated as comments
within the document format structure. Both locations are ideal
for embedding markers since most rendering programs ignore
these parts of the document. The embedded markers can be
used in Snort signatures for detecting exfiltration.
V. EVALUATION
A. Masquerade detection using Decoy Documents as Bait
We have defined the general properties that decoys should
have and discussed how we may measure these properties, but
here we focus on the most important property: detectability.
Under ideal testing conditions, decoy efficacy could be shown
through deployment on true operational systems either within
an enterprise environment, or on personal computers, by the
number of attacks they are able to detect or thwart (they have a
deterrence effect). However, given reasonable time limits, the
infrequency of attacks within the insider threat model makes
this approach impractical within a university environment. As
we mentioned we are now seeking a larger user population to
study and measure decoy generation over time.
Another approach to evaluation is a user study in which
users are organized and asked to evaluate decoys based on
each of the key decoy properties mentioned earlier. We take
human evaluation to be the gold standard of evaluation since
the human mind is the ultimate target of our decoys. That is,
we wish to show how well our decoys can induce deception
on human test subjects. One of the challenges of conducting a
traditional user study lies in the logistics of obtaining volun-
teers. In our methodology, we attempt to reduce this challenge
by leveraging external attackers to serve as participants in
our study on masquerade detection. To do so, we “invite”
attackers (or more accurately, bamboozle them) into our study
by attracting them with a set of vulnerable systems on the
university network, which also serve as our testing platform.
Our test platform is embedded within a honeynet [9]. It
consists of several virtual machines running Linux and con-
figured with Sebek [10] to capture attacker activities including
commands and file references. In order to limit potential
damage from system compromise and still allow for testing,
we configured the honeynet to allow all incoming connections
while restricting the number of outgoing connections.
The virtual machine hosts within the honeynet were con-
figured with accounts and home directories for three decoy
usernames. To make the environment as real as possible,
genuine data from personal accounts on other systems were
loaded into each of the home directories. We changed name
references within the data to reflect those of the appropriate
decoy users. In total, our phony user accounts contained 15 or
more directories and 50-100 files. The hosts were then seeded
with several of D3’s decoy files using the decoy distributor
utility. The decoy files were generated to have conspicuous
names such as “stolen passwords”, “credit card”, “private
data”, and “Gmail AccountInfo”, but were distributed within
the polluted home directories of the decoy accounts, making
the environment as real as possible.
To lure test subjects into the study, our initial approach
was to use attackers that attempt to gain internal access via
password scanning. Password scanning attacks are common on
the university network, where attempts on a typical machine
are in the range of thousands per day. To enable attacker
access, we conducted a short study to first determine the most
common usernames and passwords (excluding those for root
and actual users) used in these attempts. We created accounts
with several of these usernames and passwords, to quickly
learn that this breed of attacker was not going to suffice for
our user study; their sole purpose seemed confined to creating
zombies for botnets. While this may be a valid threat to study
while evaluating decoys [7], allowing bots to operate on the
university network poses too much risk.
In our second and more aggressive approach, we narrowed
our recruitment effort to web forums and IRC channels with
the expectation and hope that we would get fewer attacks
involving botnets. In this approach, we selected several high
volume forums to solicit volunteers and posted variations of
invitations with messages that included hostnames, usernames,
and passwords. The idea was to provide just enough innocent-
looking information from a novice to lure people into our
machines without providing direct evidence that we were
conducting a deception-based experiment. Note that we de-
liberately omit the names of the forums used and the exact
details of the messages, as this is an ongoing study.
While our methodology could, in theory, provide anyone
with access to our test platform, by selectively choosing the
location of postings and contents postings, we expected to
recruit two primary classes of individuals:
• Legitimate and generally curious computer-savvy individ-
uals. These users have no interest in extending privileges
in an unauthorized way, but participate in the study out
of curiosity, as there is no other incentive.
• Unscrupulous opportunistic hackers who attempt to ex-
tend their network access by whatever means afforded to
them. These individuals are enticed by our posting as they
see our machines as low “hanging fruit” in their targeting
campaign.
In either case, we believe these individuals to be suitable
candidates for our study (with one caveat mentioned later).
Both classes of individuals can be used in measuring the
enticement property of decoys. We measure this by examining
the behavior exhibited in file access, both with respect to the
particular files a user attempts to read and in the order in which
the files are read. For example, if all users consistently read
the same file first, we know the file must indeed be enticing.
In regards to indistinguishability of the decoys, we note
that the content of these decoys contains bait information in
the form of monitored credentials on real systems. Certainly,
if our attackers take the time to use the decoy credentials,
there is an implication that they must also be believable. More
importantly though, if they use the credentials and we detect
their use, we have also answered the most important question
of – can we detect the attacker? Note that the first class of the
individuals is by definition, not useful for this part of the study.
That is, attempting to use credentials found on our machines
is clearly an illicit activity, which they would not partake in.
Unfortunately, we do not have a good way of distinguishing
the two classes, so we get slightly skewed results.
Over the span of the first week 3, our hosts netted 20
unique users, determined anecdotally by source IP address
and reinforced by the unique behaviors exhibited by each.
The length of user sessions ranged from minutes to hours.
The users that spent hours were focused on activities that
included writing code and attempting to install other software,
presumably with malicious intent. The most common activities
exhibited for users upon login included activities such as:
determining who else was on the machine, checking and
deleting the command history, and exploring the system (i.e.,
reading the most conspicuous files). We note that in almost
all cases, our decoys were among the first few files viewed by
users upon initial login (as noted, viewing the history file was
also popular). The most significant observations were made
for 6 of the 20 unique users:
1) There were three attempts to use Gmail credentials that
were contained in a decoy document, which triggered
an alert on SONAR.
2) One attacker changed the password on a bogus Gmail
account, which also triggered a SONAR alert.
3) There were at least two attempts to exfiltrate decoy files
(with scp and sftp; one file, named “stolenpasswords”,
contained credentials to the university systems.
4) There was one attempt to use the university credentials
contained in the “stolenpassword” file, which we were
alerted to by the monitor that signaled an alert to
SONAR.
We take these results as evidence that D3/SONAR indeed has
value as a defense against masqueraders. While only 5 of the
20 users sounded an alarm on SONAR, we emphasize that our
methodology did include an unknown proportion of benign
users. Furthermore, the focus of study was on masquerade
detection; admittedly, we do not yet have a good way of
evaluating our system on traitors, but this will be the focus
of future work.
One flaw in our evaluation methodology that was revealed
during testing was that we allowed users to make changes to
the file system. We did this deliberately to increase the realism
of the environment in the experiments. The problem this
created was that it made decoy defense vulnerable to deletion
(e.g., several of our visitors executed wholesale deletion of
files with “rm -rf *”) . This poses a problem in our testing
methodology, but not necessarily in practice. That is, the act
of deleting files is in itself a detectable behavior that would
alert monitors of suspicious behavior.
In this study, we omitted testing decoy documents with
embedded beacons. The honeypots set up to attract remote
3Most attacks occurred within the first 8-hour period after posting.
attackers were stripped down Linux machines that had no
installed applications necessary to open and render the decoy
documents. We believe the value of beacon documents to be
self-evident. We encourage the reader to visit and test the D3
site, and participate in our planned longitudinal study. In the
next section we describe tests of the beacon implementation
on multiple hosts.
B. Beacon Implementation Tests
To test the robustness of the beacon implementations we
tested them with the most common configurations of operating
systems and document viewers. To this end, we contacted
a random group of users across the Internet and sent them
each two types of beacon documents along with a request that
they open them as part of a benign experiment. The results
of tests conducted on PDF and Word beacons are presented
in Table 1 and 2 below. These results are a representative
sample of real users across multiple hosts accessing the beacon
documents. For the most part the beacon technology works
well on the windows platform while not as well on Mac
and Linux operating systems. The reason is that the default
PDF reader is not Adobe’s and does not execute Javascript
embedded within the documents. Similarly, Word document
beacons do not work when applications other than Microsoft
Word (e.g., OpenOffice or Google Docs) are used to open
them. We are currently researching ways to address these
limitations and will focus on them in future work.
TABLE I
PDF BEACON TEST RESULTS
OS Application #Tests #Pings
Windows XP Adobe 6 6
Windows Vista Adobe 4 4
Mac OS Preview 1 0
Mac OS Adobe 1 1
Ubuntu Evince 1 0
TABLE II
WORD BEACON TEST RESULTS
OS Application #Tests #Pings
Windows XP Word 5 4
Windows XP GoogleDocs 1 0
Windows Vista Adobe 4 4
Mac OS Word 2 2
Linux OpenOffice 1 0
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our work focuses on the study and creation of bait infor-
mation with the aim of exposing or thwarting the exploitation
of exfiltrated information by malicious insiders. As future
work, we intend to explore how this approach might also
be applicable in detecting accidental violations of policy,
as a means of warning users and organizations about such
violations. The benefit of using the proposed decoy document
system for this purpose is that it can potentially operate
without the privacy repercussions if a mistake is made; such a
benefit differentiates the approach from traditional monitoring
approaches. Another direction to explore is how to improve the
believability of decoys documents. We are planning a series
of user studies to help us determine how users treat different
attributes of a document in a specific context, such as whether
an attacker would find more believable a document purporting
to contain tax information that is encrypted/protected with a
weak (predictable) passphrase, compared to an unprotected
version of the same document.
In conclusion, although the use of bait information and sim-
ilar trap-based defenses is well known, most of those efforts
have focused either on artifacts that are logically separate from
the operational systems (e.g., honeypots [23]) or on low-level
snippets of information created manually (e.g., fake database
records [24]). The D3 system is a scalable and automated
trap-based defensive system that forces attackers to expend
considerable effort to identify realistic useful information
from purposely planted bogus information intended to deceive.
Naturally, the probability of exposing a malicious insider with
trap-based defense tactics increases with the amount of decoy
information that is generated and disseminated. D3 offers the
novel service of automatically creating and managing decoy
documents, enabling the throttling of bait based on the desired
protection level or cost (e.g., interference) one is willing to pay.
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APPENDIX
Fig. 2. Decoy email message with embedded Gmail account information.
Fig. 3. Decoy tax document with bogus user information.
